Appropriate Opportunism or Bad Business Practice?  Stakeholder Theory, Ethics, and the Franchise Relocation Issue by Mason, Daniel S. & Slack, Trevor
Marquette Sports Law Review
Volume 7
Issue 2 Spring Article 7
Appropriate Opportunism or Bad Business




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw
Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Daniel S. Mason and Trevor Slack, Appropriate Opportunism or Bad Business Practice? Stakeholder Theory, Ethics, and the Franchise
Relocation Issue, 7 Marq. Sports L. J. 399 (1997)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol7/iss2/7
APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNISM OR BAD
BUSINESS PRACTICE? STAKEHOLDER





The operation of professional sports leagues and their member teams
has been a frequent site of economic, financial, and legal analysis.' One
aspect of these operations is the placement of franchises in new or ex-
isting markets. Such initiatives have been shown to have a profound im-
pact on the communities that host teams, and ultimately the leagues and
franchises themselves. This impact is twofold, as there are economic
and non-economic benefits3 that can be accrued through affiliating with
1. In addition to an established body of literature concerning sports and the law, there
have been numerous books that look at the financial, economic and business aspects of the
professional sports industry. See, e.g., TirE BusINEss OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS (P.D.
Staudohar & J.A. Mangan eds., 1991); DIAMONDS ARE FOREVER: THE BUSINESS OF BASE-
BALL (P.M. Summers ed. 1992); GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS (R. Noll ed. 1994);
THE NAME OF THE GAME: THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS (J. Gorman & K. Cal-
houn eds., 1994); THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF SPORTS (G.W. Scully ed. 1995); PAY DIRT:
THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORT (J. Quirk & R.D. Fort eds., 1992); PLAYING
FOR DOLLARS: LABOR RELATIONS AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS (P.D. Staudohar ed. 1996);
BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL
PASTIME (A. Zimbalist ed. 1995); SPORTSBIz: AN IRREVERANT LOOK AT BIG BUSINESS IN
PRO SPORTS (D. Hofmann & M.J. Greenberg eds., 1989).
2. For an overview of this topic, see D.V. BAIM, THE SPORTS STADIUM AS A MUNICIPAL
INVESTMENT (1994); R.A. Baade and R.F. Dye, The Impact of Stadiums and Professional
Sports on Metropolitan Development, 21 GROWTH & CHANGE 1-14 (1990).
3. Perhaps the most significant intangible benefit to a community is status as a "Big
League City." According to Shropshire, "noneconomic arguments sometimes are most effec-
tive in convincing the citizens of a city that the presence of a sports franchise is important."
KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, THE SPORTS FRANCHISE GAME: CITIES IN PURSUIT OF SPORTS
FRANCHISES, EVENTS, STADIUMS, AND ARENAS 4 (1995). While larger urban centers such as
New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles do not require a professional sports franchise to claim
"Big League City" status, the acquisition and/or success of a major professional sports team by
a lesser urban center might be the only distinguishing factor between that city and the other
cities in North America similar in size, economic output, and amenities. See C. EUCHNER,
PLAYING THE FIELD: WHY SPORTS TEAMS MOVE AND CITIES FIm-rr TO KEEP THEM (1993).
Thus, the civic boosterism generated by the tribulations of a local club may be a common bond
shared by a city's inhabitants; See, e.g., R. GRUNEAU & D. WHITSON, HOCKEY NIGHT IN CAN-
ADA: SPORT, IDENTITIES, AND CULTURAL POLITICS 199-221 (1993); JOHN WILSON, PLAYING
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a team and league. Because of the potential benefits and damages that
can occur as a result of a team-community relationship, the operations of
professional sports leagues have long been subject to the scrutiny of gov-
ernment bodies and officials.4 In addition, the growth of this industry in
recent decades has resulted in an even greater concern over the condi-
tions governing the team-community relationship.
Historically, government interest 5 in professional sports reflected the
unique appeal that sports had to the general public, 6 and increased along
with the growth and development of the four major professional sports
leagues.7 Despite this, leagues and teams have been able to maintain an
enviable position when negotiating with communities for the use of facil-
ities to host games.
While the importance of sport in society may partially explain the
desire for cities to either acquire or keep existing teams within their bor-
ders, the recent growth in the professional sports industry has also in-
creased the financial impact that agreements with teams have on host
communities. Over the past few decades, new and greater revenue
By THE RULES: SPORT, SOCIETY, AND THE STATE 234-264 (1994). This public sentiment often
results in cities that pursue or try to retain franchises in lieu of recognizing economic
feasibility.
4. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 3; S.R. LOWE, THE KID ON THE SANDLOT. CONGRESS
AND PROFESSIONAL SPORT 1910-1992 (1995).
5. Increased government interest also reflects the entrenchment of sport within our cul-
ture, a phenomenon that extends beyond the impact of individual teams on individual commu-
nities. For many citizens of both Canada and the U.S., the significance of the World Series,
Super Bowl, NBA Finals, and Stanley Cup Playoffs transcends that of a single sporting con-
test, so much so that these events have established themselves as social institutions. One argu-
ment has been that, because these events have become institutions in society, we have a basic
right to watch these games on television. As Wilson explained, "the state has some obligation
to ensure public access to major sporting events: they are in the public domain and should not
be privatized." WILSON, supra note 3, at 321. For these reasons, professional team sports
have achieved an importance in our society that exceeds that of many other industries of
similar economic magnitude, which explains the apparent need for government intervention
into the operations of professional sports leagues. Why the government has concerned itself
with the operations of professional sport has escaped some government officials, including
Senator Howard Metzenbaum, who wondered aloud at why the U.S. Senate would be debat-
ing the operations of professional sports franchises. Id. at 27.
6. The impact of sport on society has been greatly discussed in the academic literature.
See, e.g., SPORT, CULTURE, AND THE MODERN STATE (H. Cantelon & R. Gruneau eds.. 1982);
A WHOLE NEW BALL GAME: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN SPORTS (A. Guttman ed.
1988); GRUNEAU & WHITSON, supra note 3; SPORT IN THE SOCIO-CULTURAL PROCESS (M. M.
Hart ed. 1972).
7. This includes Major League Baseball (comprised of the American and National
Leagues), the National Basketball Association, National Football League, and National
Hockey League.
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sources arising from large television contracts,8 increased sales of mer-
chandise,9 skyrocketing franchise values,'" and new corporate inter-
locks" have all made the business of professional sport far more
lucrative. However, the growth in network television contracts has lev-
eled off in recent years,'2 and the billions of dollars generated through
licensing cannot continue to grow.' 3 So, where is all this money coming
from? Franchise values continue to soar, but this escalation may not re-
8. For example, in the National Football League, television revenues have risen dramati-
cally since 1960:




1960-61 $600,000 $ 45,000
1962-63 $ 4.65 Million $330,000
1964-65 $ 28.2 Million $ 1 Million
1966-69 $ 75.2 Million $ 1.6 Million
1970-73 $ 185 Million $ 1.8 Million
1974-77 $ 269 Million $ 2.6 Million
1978-81 $ 646 Million $ 5.8 Million
1982-86 $ 2.1 Billion $13.6 Million
1987-89 $1.428 Billion $16.7 Million
1990-93 $ 3.65 Billion $32.6 Million
1994-97 $ 4.4 Billion $39.2 Million
S. Wulf, Out Foxed: Rupert Murdoch's Upstart Network Snatched the NFL from CBS in a
Coup That Will Change the Face of Televised Sports, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 27, 1994, at
16; Staudohar, supra note 1, at 60. Each NFL team received average media revenues of $39.8
million for the 1995 season. T. Atre et al., Sport: The High-Stakes Game of Team Ownership-
Owning a Pro Sports Team Can Be More Lucrative Than Owning Stocks and Bonds. But Its
Becoming a lot Riskier, Fn'. WORLD, May 20, 1996, at 49-65.
9. Retail sales of licensed merchandise for the four major professional sports leagues
reached $8.7 billion in 1993, up from $2 billion in 1988. M.K. Ozanian, Following the Money:
FW's First Annual Report on the Economics of Sports, FIN. WORLD, Feb. 14, 1995, at 30.
10. For a detailed look at the estimated values of sports franchises, see Atre et al., supra
note 8, at 49-65.
11. These interlocks can occur at a number of levels. The first is for a corporation to
purchase a sports team, and then to exploit the synergy that is created through the arrange-
ment between the team and the corporation's other business interests. An example is Ted
Turner, who televises the games of his baseball team, the Atlanta Braves, on his own cable
station. Another way through which corporate interlocks can occur is through the sponsorship
of a league, team, or facility by a corporation. Often, arenas will be renamed, or certain prod-
ucts will become known as "Official" products of a certain team or league.
12. Ozanian, supra note 9, at 30.
13. While this may not yet be evident, the sales of licensed apparel to groups who have no
other affiliation to the sports that are portrayed on the merchandise suggests that some of the
sales have been caused by a "fad." Growth in North American sales may have already peaked,
prompting leagues such as the NBA to focus their attentions on the global marketplace.
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flect increased effectiveness in business practices. Rather, increases in
team values are often due to moves to new venues,' 4 which are fre-
quently funded by a host community. The most obvious example of this
is the rise in value of the Baltimore Orioles franchise since their move to
Oriole Park at Camden Yards. 5 This Park was built by a community
that was desperate to retain its only remaining professional sports team;
they had lost their beloved NFL Colts in the 1980s.16 Thus, professional
sports team owners use the threat of moving their franchises in order to
increase their market value. The result is a public that must concede to
such demands, or risk losing all the apparent benefits that accrue from
having a franchise in their community. It is obvious that the communi-
ties are caving in; in the 1990s alone, forty-five new stadiums and arenas
will be built at a cost of $9 billion, 80% of which will be from public
sources.' 7 This leads to two problems: 1) the prominence or importance
of having a sports team can result in municipal decisions that are not in
the best interests of a community as a whole; and 2) the large amount of
money attached to acquiring or losing a team results in a more signifi-
cant financial risk to the communities. While previous legal literature
has focused on the merits of judicial mechanisms set up to control
franchise relocation, this article seeks to identify a fundamental problem
that underpins this issue. While benefitting the individual team, moving
a franchise can have both detrimental effects on the leagues as a whole,
and on the host communities that lose a club. Thus, an ethical dilemma
is faced by each team owner that seeks to relocate. While it is under-
standable that a team might need to relocate for financial survival, many
teams move from a lucrative position to an even more appealing situa-
tion.18 The onus is then on the team owner to weigh the merits of in-
14. J. Christie, Value of Franchise Depends on Stadium, TORONTo GLOBE & MAIL, Nov.
17, 1995, at A16.
15. Because the Orioles generate a lot of revenue through their ballpark, this club is more
resistant to changes in revenue that might be caused by less lucrative TV contracts. Thus, the
club is a more stable investment and, because of the large revenue it generates through its
facility, has a high franchise value. M.K. Ozanian, How to Buy a Sports Team" Sports Team
Values Have Risen Over the Past Six Years. But With Any Investment, Beware of the Pitfalls,
FIN. WORLD, MAY 20, 1996, AT 66.
16. NFL football returned to Baltimore in the fall of 1996, when the Cleveland Browns
relocated and commenced play as the Ravens.
17. E. Brady & D. Howlett, Cost to Hit $9 Billion by Decade's End, But Who's Paying For
It? USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 1996, at 13C.
18. As explained by Cardwell, the franchise relocation game is no longer confined to
teams in financial trouble; "even apparently successful franchises are now in 'play.'" D.E.
Cardwell, Local Governments Respond to Franchise Free Agency, 6 FOR THE RECORD 4
(1995-96).
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creasing revenues over the financial and socio-emotional damages
caused to a vacated or spurned community. This article analyzes the
professional sport-public relationship using an approach from the man-
agement literature-stakeholder theory. We use stakeholder theory to
explain the nature of this association, and describe the behavior of team
owners in terms of business ethics. After a brief explanation of the cen-
tral tenets of stakeholder theory, we examine three specific groups who
are particularly vulnerable to franchise relocation, and show how reloca-
tion affects the team-community relationship, and, ultimately, public in-
terest in professional sport. Having recognized these groups, we discuss
how league operators have justified their position in exploiting host com-
munities. Following this, we will use stakeholder theory to explain how
relocations undermine interest in the league product, resulting in long-
term harm to leagues and their franchises. This discussion will reveal
how inappropriate franchise relocations can be viewed as unethical, as
the interests of the host communities are not adequately weighed. Thus,
traditional solutions such as legal intervention may only be a short-term
remedy to the problem of unwarranted franchise relocation, as the
leagues and their owners must first recognize the underlying damage
that their actions can cause. Finally, we make some comments regarding
the future of professional sports in North America.
II. STAKEHOLDER THEORY: A FRAMEWORK
Operated as private, for-profit business operations, 19 professional
sports leagues have a dramatic effect on many members of society. Simi-
larly, the public (beyond those who follow and support the function of
the leagues) has a profound effect on the operations of professional
sports leagues. To look at this concept in more detail, we will adopt a
stakeholder theory approach.20 In the context of professional sports
leagues, the focal firm or organization is the league itself, while the own-
ers, stockholders, management, players, and other personnel act as
stakeholders since they have a "stake" in the production of the league
product. More specifically, a stakeholder is also defined as "any group
19. While this would seem self-evident, team owners have not always been complete
profit maximizers. This is due to the other benefits that owning franchises can bring, such as
increased public profile, and ego fulfillment. See, e.g., D. KoWET, THE RICH WHO OWN
SPORTS (1977); JJ. Brower, Professional Sports Team Ownership: Fun, Profit, and Ideology of
the Power Elite, 12 INT. R. OF SPORT SOCIOLOGY 79-98 (1977). The leagues themselves are set
up as non-profit organizations; however, their intent is certainly to generate profits for the
clubs.
20. See R.E. FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT. A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984).
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or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an or-
ganization's purpose.""1 Stakeholders are obviously those who attend or
watch professional sports games on television, or purchase league-re-
lated merchandise, and have a direct financial impact on the leagues.
However, Starik also suggests that the stakeholder concept has "socio-
emotional (spiritual), ethical, and legal, in addition to the traditional
political-economic foundations."2 Thus, it is easy to see that the in-
habitants of communities that either seek to hold onto or obtain a pro-
fessional sports franchise, because of their socio-emotional ties to a
team, are also significant stakeholders in this industry.
Not only are those who are directly affiliated with a team's opera-
tions-employees and fans, in particular-reliant upon the presence of
the team, but a significant portion of the rest of a community is also
affected. This would include those individuals relocated in order to build
facilities, or the taxpayers who assume the financial burden of any public
financial assistance to the team. Using this logic, we can see how host
communities act as stakeholders. The corporation (in this case the
league) is the vehicle through which numerous and diverse groups seek
to accomplish different, and not always congruent, functions.2 3
Thus, the relationship between the team and the host community can
be seen as somewhat reciprocal. It then seems appropriate that deci-
sions made by teams to relocate should consider the interests of the host
communities. This is even more apparent today, when the financial im-
pact that a professional sports franchise has on a community continues
to grow. In a discussion of the moral obligations facing businesses,
Fieser reports that some consider the size of a business as being a factor;
as size increases, more lives are affected by a business' decisions.24 Thus,
as the professional sports industry becomes a more lucrative and signifi-
cant industry, the recognition of stakeholder interests must become an
integral part of the business strategies of the leagues, teams, and their
owners.
However, the behavior of certain team owners suggests that the im-
portance of host communities as legitimate stakeholders has been over-
looked in order to realize a profit for themselves. This is in direct
21. M. Starik, Essay by Mark Starik: the Toronto Conference: Reflections on Stakeholder
Theory, 33 Bus. & Soc. 90 (1994) (citing FREEMAN, supra note 20, at 52).
22. Id. at 92.
23. T. Donaldson & L.E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts,
Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 70 (1995).
24. J. Fieser, Do Businesses Have Moral Obligations Beyond What the Law Requires?, 15
J. OF Bus. ETmics 458 (1996).
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contrast to the tenets of stakeholder theory, whose adherents claim that
it is the responsibility of management to select activities and direct re-
sources that benefit all stakeholders.2 5 It is also supported from an ethi-
cal point of view by Lozano, who notes that today, more so than in the
past, corporations must realize that different interest groups have a stake
in their operations.26 In this way, the behavior of owners who relocate
to the detriment of the vacated host community can be couched in ethi-
cal terms, as moving unnecessarily can be seen as disregarding the needs
of a significant stakeholder. In order to understand the dynamics of this
interrelationship, we look more closely at one aspect of the league-com-
munity dyad, franchise relocation, and in this context the leagues' appar-
ent lack of recognition of the interests of one significant stakeholder
group-the host community.
III. PROFESSIONAL TEAMS AND THE COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDER:
FRANCHISE RELOCATION
A review of the franchise relocation issue provides a good illustration
of the dynamic relationship between teams and their host communities,
because of the dramatic impact that the presence of a professional team
has on a given city. In this section, we will present three examples of
situations in which the community, as a stakeholder, is particularly vul-
nerable to franchise relocation. In this way, the development of the
team-community stakeholder relationship in professional sports can be
shown.
A. Communities Acquiring Teams
The first example of a stakeholder group exploited by professional
sports teams and leagues is the community that wants to host a profes-
sional sports team. With the importance of professional sports teams
eclipsing simple economic impact, it is no wonder that many cities have
scrambled to acquire professional sports franchises. 27 This phenomenon
25. See Donaldson & Preston, supra note 23.
26. J.M. Lozano, Ethics and Management: A Controversial Issue, 15 J. OF Bus. ETaics 227
(1996).
27. One such community is the city of Nashville. In many instances, teams will use the
threat of relocating to sweeten their own lease agreement, without any serious desire to relo-
cate. After winning the Stanley Cup in the spring of 1995, the New Jersey Devils publicly
entertained ideas of moving to Nashville. As explained by Crothers, "it hardly matters
whether the Devils are seriously considering a move to Music City, U.S.A., or whether it a
bluff; some governmental or quasi-governmental public entity-either in New Jersey or Nash-
ville-is going to shell out millions in civic resources that would be better spent on schools,
cops or real job creation." T. Crothers, The Shakedown: Greedy Owners are Threatening to
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has become even more apparent over the last few decades, as cities have
made significant financial investments to lure teams from other cities, or
to present themselves as suitable sites for league expansion.' Both Ma-
jor League Baseball (MLB) and the National Football League (NFL)
have recognized this demand, and have adjusted their selection criteria
accordingly, to get even more concessions from these often desperate
communities.2 9 Cities today must almost always provide baseball or
football-only venues in order for consideration for an expansion
franchise in those sports.30 This is in contrast to the multipurpose facili-
ties that were built during the mid 1960s through the early 1990s,"' and
makes it particularly difficult for a community to justify a capital expen-
diture in excess of $200 million 32 in order to house a professional foot-
ball team that will only use the stadium for a fraction of the dates
available in any given year. When this expenditure is actually made, the
city is likely to concede to future demands of NFL or MLB franchises, as
these large, expensive facilities often have little use outside of hosting
professional sports contests. 33 It also makes it difficult for communities
to make concessions for one sport and not do the same for another team
in another league in the same city.34 Despite these potential problems,
politicians recognize the public relations advantages of acquiring a
Move Their Teams if Demands for New Stadiums, Better Lease Deals, etc., Aren't Met, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, June 19, 1995, at 79. Of course, Nashville will "shell out," only this time it will
be for an NFL stadium for the relocating Houston Oilers.
28. The city of Tampa built the Suncoast Dome in order to gain either an expansion team,
or to lure an existing franchise to the area; see B. ANDELMAN, STADIUM FOR RENT: TAMPA
BAY'S QUEST FOR MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (1993).
29. In Denver's bid for an expansion baseball franchise, eventually "the mayor stepped
in and made baseball a government priority. [He recognized] that schmoozing and lobbying
are not enough, that the only way to win [an expansion team] is with a staggering investment
of public funds." D. WHrFORD, PLAYING HARDBALL: THE HIGH-STAKES BATrLE FOR
BASEBALL'S NEw FRANCHISES 47 (1993).
30. One of the reasons that Denver received its baseball franchise was because it intended
on building a baseball-only park for the Rockies.
31. Professional sport's obsession with modernity started with the construction of the
Houston Astrodome, and has continued through the completion of Toronto's Skydome. Un-
like the facilities such as Coors Field, and Oriole Park at Camden Yards, these "space age"
facilities were built to be marvels of technology that could be used for a variety of purposes.
32. As explained by Greenberg and Gray, "it is not uncommon for a new facility to cost
from $200 to $250 million dollars." M.J. GREENBERG & J.T. GRAY, THE STADIUM GAME 20
(1996).
1 33. Gray notes that "once a city has committed the resources to constructing and main-
taining a stadium designed for professional football, it must have a professional football team
as a tenant since alternative uses are limited." J.A. Gray, Section I of the Sherman Act and
Control Over NFL Franchise Locations: The Problem of Opportunistic Behavior, 25 AM. Bus.
L. J. 131 (1987).
34. An example would be Baltimore.
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franchise while they are in office, but this can lead to problems where
they may not be acting on the wishes of their communities as a Whole.
Inevitably, host communities are either burdened with the possibility of
financially supporting private enterprise, or tormented by a missed op-
portunity to become a "Big League City."
Thus, communities that seek professional sports teams are significant
stakeholders in the business of professional sports leagues; teams either
obtain large inducements to relocate, or can renegotiate sweetheart
deals with their existing communities' sports authorities by threatening
to move. 6 In this manner, the aspiring host community has a strong
effect on the revenue-generating capabilities of professional sports
teams, even when it does not manage to seduce team owners with guar-
anteed revenues and concessions. However, as will be discussed later in
this article, the power that this stakeholder group has will ultimately de-
termine the long-term viability of the very leagues that these communi-
ties seek affiliation with.
B. Communities Losing Teams
Just as acquiring a franchise can be a significant boost to the image of
the political groups that oversee a particular region and the people who
inhabit their constituencies, losing a franchise can have an equal, if not
more significant impact on public opinion. 7 Thus, politicians are leery
about losing a franchise while they are in office. This fact is not lost on
the professional sports teams and leagues, who exploit this leverage
when negotiating with stadium authorities.38 The community, however,
is the hardest hit by the departure of an established team. In Cleveland,
the recent loss of the NFL Browns has left a void in the lives of many
inhabitants of that city. According to Ron Glasenapp, producer of a lo-
cal radio talk show, "Football is a religion in Cleveland, and people
aren't going to know what to do with their Sundays. '39 The resulting
environment created by the desire for sports franchises, as well as the
35. See, e.g., EUCHNER, supra note 3.
36. Communities in search of teams seem more inclined to try to induce an existing
franchise from another city, rather than run the risk of trying (usually without success) in
obtaining an expansion franchise. J. Christie & L. Millson, Wooing Franchises a U.S. Pastime,
TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 17, 1995, at A16.
37. One of the greatest fears that a politician can have would be to lose a professional
sports franchise during a term in office.
38. See ANDELMAN, supra note 28 to see how baseball's White Sox used Tampa to gain a
new facility in Chicago.
39. K. Allen, Cleveland Must Find Alternatives to Football, USA TODAY, Aug. 30, 1996, at
20E.
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fear of losing teams to relocation, has resulted in a large disparity in
bargaining power between sports teams/leagues and communities.
This is not to say that communities have not sought every possible
option to stop franchises from relocating. Perhaps the most visible ex-
ample of this occurred with the move of the National Football League's
Raiders team from Oakland to Los Angeles in the early 1980s. Ulti-
mately, both the NFL and the city of Oakland were unable to stop the
move; however, the efforts of Oakland to try to keep the franchise in
that city revealed the significant effects that a professional sports team
has on a community. In attempting to retain the team, the city tried to
claim ownership of the club in using the concept of eminent domain.4"
While it is not the purpose of this article to review the legal aspects of
this concept, it provides an example of how the city of Oakland viewed
the team as a public asset of which it tried to retain control.
C. The Small Market
Perhaps the best example of a stakeholder group that has been tradi-
tionally abused by the operations of professional sports leagues is the
small market community. Being considered a small market puts addi-
tional pressures on host communities seeking to avoid losing a team to
relocation. These communities have already developed a strong rela-
tionship with the sports team and the league, but for reasons to be dis-
cussed, have become inadequate as a site for hosting games. The result
is a community that, because of its established relationship with the
team, ends up "hanging on" to try to stop the team from moving. Al-
most without exception, the team eventually moves to another city, but
not before placing a significant financial burden on the taxpayers of the
region.
Before a discussion of the tribulations of this stakeholder group can
be achieved, a closer look at what constitutes a small market is required.
A small population and/or surrounding television market makes this
type of community less desirable to the leagues, who wish to ensure
large revenues. These communities are typically the most desperate to
be considered a "Big League City," as often the only defining difference
between it and other communities of similar size and economic output is
the existence of-and perhaps success of-a professional sports
franchise. In some instances, a community may have had a professional
40. See, e.g., EUCHNER, supra note 3; G.J. Brumback and A.R. Heyman, Eminent Do-
main: Condemnation of Professional Football Franchises and the Commerce Clause Defense,
28 HOWARD L. J. 773-794 (1995).
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team for many years, but due to changing economic conditions, no
longer seems suitable for hosting a financially competitive team. Thus,
many communities who are encountering economic hardship may be fur-
ther burdened by efforts to retain a team that the city can no longer
support.
Examples of this problem can be found in the recent moves of two
NHL teams. The Quebec Nordiques were perennial cellar-dwellers; be-
tween 1987 and 1995 the team managed to make the NHL playoffs only
twice.41 Despite the fact that the team enjoyed relatively stable attend-
ance, the team's arena, the Colisee, lacked the luxury boxes and other
revenue-generating amenities available in other NHL arenas. In addi-
tion, the small population base, devalued Canadian dollar, and higher
Provincial taxes made it more difficult to lure high-caliber players to play
in the city.42 Thus, Quebec City had all the qualities of a "small market,"
which made it difficult to compete on an even level with other league
clubs. The team's owners sought the financial aid of the local and pro-
vincial governments; 43 however, the team was eventually sold and
moved to Colorado." The team has since won the Stanley Cup, which is
perhaps a bitter pill to swallow for the fans who supported the club
through its lean years in Quebec. 45
Similarly, the Winnipeg Jets moved to Phoenix for the 1996-97 sea-
son. For years, the teams had found it difficult to compete in Winnipeg;
the local and Provincial governments often intervened to help cover
team losses.46 Despite such assistance, the team needed a new arena in
41. Making the NHL playoffs is not considered a difficult task; 16 of the 26 clubs make
post season play each spring. However, in both instances that the team made the playoffs, the
team did not survive past the first round. NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE GUIDE & RECORD
BOOK, 1995-96, at 33.
42. In addition, Quebec City has one of the lowest average income rates, and the highest
taxed sports fans in North America. A. Picard, Fans, Economy Suffer From Loss of Nordi-
ques, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 19, 1995, at A2.
43. Quebec Premier Jacques Parizeau had agreed to support the team with taxpayers'
money; however this was only on the condition that the Nordiques agree to cap players' sala-
ries, and guarantee the sale of 100 luxury boxes, at $100,000 each. R. Seguin, Quebec Govern-
ment to Offer Nordiques Bailout, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, May 5, 1995, at A15.
44. At one point, the Provincial government also entertained ideas of creating a lottery
fund to finance a new arena for the Nordiques. Nordiques Will Have New Look In 1996-97,
HOCKEY NEws, Apr. 14, 1995, at 5.
45. According to Picard, the loss of the Nordiques put "a real hole in the local economy."
Picard, supra note 42, at A2. The Nordiques moved to Colorado, despite claims that team
owner Marcel Aubut and his ownership group "never lost a dime on the club." M.C. Auger,
Tale of Two Professional Sports Clubs, EDMONTON J., May 5, 1995, at A14.
46. See J. SILVER, THIN ICE: MONEY POLITICS AND THE DEMISE OF AN NHL FRANCHISE
(1996). The city and provincial governments had already agreed to cover team losses from
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order to be competitive,4 7 which the government and other local inves-
tors ultimately could not finance. After an emotional "farewell" season,
the team finished its final year with a playoff loss to the Detroit Red
Wings.4 8 Memories of the Jets are not the only thing to remain in Mani-
toba; the Province and city must cover the forty million dollars that the
team lost over its final seasons,49 which may make many in the area won-
der if such a tearful good-bye season was really justifiable. Perhaps the
saddest part of the story of the Jets and the Nordiques is that there will
likely never be NHL hockey played again in those cities; although both
clubs were reasonably supported.5" Without revenue sharing, the dispar-
ity in revenues generated by the different clubs makes it very difficult for
small markets in this league to compete.51
The examples of the two recently relocated NHL teams reveal the
fundamental problem associated with franchise relocations in profes-
sional sports; instead of recognizing the problems encountered by a sig-
nificant stakeholder group, and attempting to make changes to represent
the interests of these communities, professional sports teams rely on
1991 to 1997. J. Deacon with J. MacGillivray, A Team in Trouble, MACLEANS, Feb. 6, 1995, at
66-67.
47. A new, publicly funded $111 million arena was required. Id.
48. T. Campbell, Jets End Era With Battle, Hoc, EY NEWS, May 17, 1996, at 32.
49. SILVER, supra note 46, at 67. This is a considerable sum for the taxpayers of the
province and city, which combined have a total population of less that one million.
50. While the Nordiques regularly enjoyed good crowds for games, attendance for Jets
games dropped dramatically during the 1995-96 season, from 13,013 per game in 1994-95, to
11,316 in 1995-96. B. Costello, New Rinks Raise NHL Attendance; HocKEnx NEWS, May 3,
1996, at 3. However, the fans knew that their club would be leaving at the end of the season,
which would explain the lack of interest in attending. Unfortunately, the lower attendance did
not deter the club from paying high salaries; despite having the worst attendance in the league
in 1995-96, the Jets had the ninth highest payroll in the league at $21,781,800. NHL Team
Payrolls, HOCKEY NEws, Apr. 5, 1996, at 8. Of course, the team would not need to be as
fiscally responsible knowing that the city of Winnipeg and the Province of Manitoba would be
covering any losses that the team would suffer during the season. This was evidenced during
the 1994-95 lockout, where, unlike every other NHL team, the Jets kept all but two of their
forty-five employees on payroll. SILVER, supra note 46, at 104 (citing Winnipeg Free Press,
Dec. 13, 1994).
51. J. Simpson, Hockey Deal Does Nothing to Address Canadian Teams' Problems, To-
RONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 12, 1995, at A18. Although revenue sharing seems to be an ideal
solution to the problems encountered by the small market teams, NHL Commissioner Gary
Bettman informed the mayors of Edmonton, Calgary, Winnipeg, and Quebec that the support
of local government was paramount to keeping NHL hockey in those cities. Thus, the onus is
on the cities to ensure that revenues are substantial enough for teams in smaller markets to
compete. S. Feschuk, Mayors Told They Must Help Teams: League Boss Says That Small-
Market Cities Must Be Major-League to Keep Clubs, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 8, 1994,
at A19. However, it would be inappropriate to assume that the NHL be responsible for small-
market clubs that did not receive a reasonable level of support in their communities.
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government bodies to offset financial disadvantages of being located in
small markets. Thus, instead of making decisions that reflect the needs of
all stakeholder groups, teams and leagues are further burdening this
stakeholder group, without whose support the leagues cannot operate.
D. The Unique Nature of Professional Sports as a Rationale for
Community Exploitation
The power imbalance between the community and team is not lost on
the leagues, teams, host communities, public, and governments. While
the difference in bargaining power is obvious, one has to wonder how
the leagues and their teams have been able to maintain such an enviable
position over recent years. The answer lies in the manner through which
professional sports have evolved. In many cases, the operations of pro-
fessional sports leagues have received recognition as having unique char-
acteristics by the Courts, public, and scholars alike. While it is not the
purpose of this article to debate or justify this recognition, it is important
to review the nature of professional sports team operations, in order to
explain how teams have established such a powerful bargaining position
with host communities, by enforcing "necessary" constraints that limit
franchise numbers and keeping demand for franchises high.
While the four leagues commenced operations at various times since
the late 1800s,52 they have several factors in common. Today, all four
leagues operate as a monopoly in providing the highest caliber of sport-
ing experience in each of their respective sports.53 In addition, the likeli-
hood of a rival league emerging to challenge one of the established
league's market is highly unlikely.54 This is due to a number of factors,
52. For background information on the development of the major professional sports
leagues, we would recommend reading H. SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLY YEARS (1960);
L. LOWENFISH, THE IMPERFECT DIAMOND: A HISTORY OF BASEBALL'S LABOR WARS (1991);
R.F. BURK, NEVER JUST A GAME: PLAYERS, OWNERS, AND AMERICAN BASEBALL TO 1920(1994); R. W. PETERSON, FROM CAGES TO JUMPSHOTS: PRO BASKETBALL'S EARLY YEARS(1990); D. CRUISE & A. GRIFFITHS, NET WORTH: EXPLODING THE MYTHS OF PRO HOCKEY
(1991); C.L. COLEMAN, THE TRAIL OF THE STANLEY CUP, VOLS. 1-3; D. HARRIS, THE
LEAGUE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE NFL (1986).
53. The legality of this monopoly has been scrutinized; see, e.g., J.A. Gray & S.J.K. Wal-
ters, Is the NFL an Illegal Monopoly?, 66 U. DET. L. REV. (1988); Stephen F. Ross, Break up
the Sports League Monopolies, in THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 152-174 (1991).
54. This is due to the amount of revenues that are generated. A new league would have
to establish that it provided a high caliber of the sport in order for fans to pay the high prices
for tickets, and for television networks to make large bids to show league games. Thus, it
would take well-heeled owners of a new league to acquire the services of the top players, and
suffer the ensuing financial losses that would occur as the league competed with the estab-
lished league for players and markets.
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
including the availability of premium talent to stock the new league,55
the amount of money needed to finance such a venture 56 (and withstand
the resulting financial burdens of increased player salaries),57 the
number of remaining cities suitable for hosting professional teams, and
the number of cities that, at least in the short term, could host teams
from both leagues.58
In order to prevent the emergence of a rival league, the established
league must maintain a suitable number of league franchises. Ideally, a
league will want to have enough cities desiring teams so as to keep them
bidding for the right to receive relocated franchises, and keep the bid-
ding for expansion clubs high. However, the amount of cities in search
of a new franchise should never exceed the minimum number of sites
that a new league would require to begin operations.5 9 This problem is
further complicated by the problem of "watering down" the existing
playing talent, which could potentially undermine interest in the league
product as a whole.60 This reason is frequently used by sports leagues to
55. Another problem that would arise concerns the amount of talented players available
to fill out rosters in the new league. The acquisition of players from the established league
might overcome this, but this might result in "watering down" the caliber of play in both
leagues which could be disastrous to public opinion of both circuits. This argument follows
Scully, who explains that "if the supply of high-quality playing talent were perfectly elastic, the
number of major leagues or teams within a league would have no effect on absolute quality of
play," Scully, supra note 1, at 23. However, this is not the case in professional sports leagues,
which have a very low elasticity of supply of prime athletic talent.
56. Until such time as either the established or new league folded, or the two leagues
merged, financial losses would be significant for both sides. In the cases of the American
Basketball Association, American Football League, and World Hockey Association, this was
eventually achieved.
57. For example, the creation of the World Hockey Association for the 1972-73 resulted in
large salary increases for players who decided to sign with the new league, or were paid higher
salaries to remain in the NHL. Some estimates have claimed that the WHA resulted in as
much as a 65% increase in hockey players' salaries during its first season alone. Quirk & Fort,
supra note 1, at 330.
58. Quirk and Fort contend that a new league's best bet for instant success would be to
put franchises in the centers that do not yet feature professional teams in that particular sport,
rather than go through the difficulty of moving into an established big-city market. d at 297-
98.
59. Gray and Walters, supra note 53. They explain that if the minimum number of teams
required in order to launch a legitimate rival league were eight, then the established league
need only keep the number of suitable sites for expansion to less than that number in order to
create a barrier to entry into the market. Id. at 30.
60. See supra note 55. This problem also concerns established leagues when they are con-
sidering expansion, and can be a convincing argument for leagues who are reluctant to expand
their number of teams. "More teams require the spreading of existing talent among the vari-
ous league franchises, possibly damaging the entertainment value of the league product to
consumers." T. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports Leagues Revis-
ited- Emerging Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 765 (1987). However, league
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explain why more cities do not receive franchises, while conveniently
keeping demand for teams high.
The product itself is a series of sporting contests that each league
produces and sells to distinct groups: 1) fans who pay to attend games,
and consume facility-related products such as concessions and parking;
2) television and cable networks who bid for the right to televise league
games; 3) corporations who seek increased revenues through either the
synergy of owning sports teams as part of a larger entertainment empire,
or through affiliating their own products with that of teams or a league;
4) purchasers of league-licensed apparel; and 5) cities, represented by
sports authorities, who bid for the right to host league games in their
communities and venues.6 Thus, although producing a single league
product-a series of games With an uncertain outcome-leagues sell this
product in a variety of ways to a variety of different consumers.62
Although teams are separate legal and business entities,63 most deci-
sions that affect the production and marketing of the league product are
(and should be) made at the league level.' 4 Each team is represented on
a board who makes such decisions, thus allowing for each team to have
an equal say in the operations of the league as a whole.65 Without the
cooperation of the other league members, teams could not produce the
league product, and do not have any function outside of their arrange-
ment with the league. 66 Any changes to approaches to team relocation
expansion could be justified when the benefits that a new location brings to new fans and
consumers of the league product exceeds that of the reduced enjoyment that "watering down"
may cause to the league and its fans as a whole. S.F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73
MINN. L. REv. 707 (1989). Unfortunately, it would be difficult to determine, let alone mea-
sure, exactly what these benefits are.
61. This list has been adapted from Gray and Walters, supra note 53, at 9.
62. D.S. Mason, What is the Sports Product and Who Buys It? The Marketing of Profes-
sional Sports Leagues (working paper, 1997).
63. Alan J. Ostfield, Seat License Revenue in the National Football League: Shareable or
Not?, 5 SETON HALL J. OF SPORTS L. 603 (1995).
64. This apparent contradiction has led to much debate since the early 1980s. Teams must
create the appearance of competition in order to maintain interest in the league product;
therefore, they are able to act independently in terms of activities that effect on-the-field per-
formance. Gray, supra note 33, at 127; G.A. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act:
The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, UCLA L. Rv.
263 (1984). In addition, because teams are part of a greater entity, they must cooperate on
many issues in order to produce the league product. L. Goldman, Sports, Antitrust, and the
Single-Entity Theory, 63 TULANE L. REv. 754 (1989).
65. Major League Baseball consists of two separate entities, the American and National
Leagues.
66. Roberts, supra note 64, at 247. Gray supports this concept, claiming that "unlike
members of a classic cartel, none of the clubs alone has the capability of producing and mar-
keting the product." Gray, supra note 33, at 127.
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must also be made and implemented at the league level. However,
problems exist when teams attempt to relocate without the consent of
their respective leagues.
The unique nature of professional team sports-a group of indepen-
dently owned teams uniting to produce a league product-has resulted
in unique treatment of sports leagues in the courts, while making it diffi-
cult for the leagues themselves to police the behavior of certain owners.
This only confirms that the responsibility of stopping unnecessary
franchise relocation cannot and should not be left only to legal channels;
owners must consider the financial and economic damage that is inflicted
upon the communities. In addition, the need to avoid diluting the cali-
ber of the league product, enforced by the monopoly position held by
the leagues themselves, has ensured that there will be a surplus of com-
munities without professional sports teams that are suitable host sites.
This will only serve to sustain the unequal bargaining position between
teams and communities, and provides another reason why the problem
of franchise relocation must be viewed in ethical terms; owners must
simply recognize when the greater good of the league and its stakehold-
ers outweighs personal financial gain. Finally, because the teams unite
to produce a single league product, team owners must also curtail unwar-
ranted franchise movement in order to sustain interest in the league
product as a whole.
This section has examined the relationship between three examples
of a significant stakeholder group-the host community-and profes-
sional sports leagues, and reveals the manner in which teams have used
both the desires of local communities to host teams, and the argument of
the unique nature of professional sports operations to exert bargaining
leverage over many communities. While media and other sources pro-
vide large revenues for leagues and their clubs, it is ultimately the com-
munities and their fans that will determine the long-term viability of the
professional sports leagues. As discussed above, communities seeking to
either obtain or retain franchises, and small market communities are in-
valuable stakeholders within the operations of professional sports
leagues. The fact that this stakeholder group has been neglected, if not
exploited in recent years, has been the result of an enviable position that
professional sports leagues have in obtaining playing facilities, but, how
long can this continue? What will be the long-term effects of such be-
havior on demand for the league product?
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IV. DISCUSSION
In this section, we use stakeholder theory to show how frequent
franchise relocations ultimately harm the leagues, by undermining inter-
est in the league product, and argue that the solution to this problem
must be couched in terms of business ethics, rather than legal interven-
tion. This is because the leagues and the league clubs must first recog-
nize the problems that continued relocations will have on host
communities; legal restraints may reduce such behavior, but do not ad-
dress the underlying problem itself.
A. How Franchise Relocations Will Undermine League Operations
We have already determined that the communities that host profes-
sional sports teams are stakeholders within the professional sports indus-
try, as they have a direct impact on-and are directly affected by-
league and team operations. As discussed in the previous section, com-
munities that vie for but do not receive teams also act as significant
stakeholders, by both increasing the revenues of professional sports
teams, and affecting the relationship between teams and their existing
communities. The term community includes the members of the area
who directly pay to watch, listen, or wear anything affiliated with the
local team and the league itself. Without such support, the team could
not operate in that city. However, any person who is affected by indirect
economic or psychological interaction with the team or its fans (such as
increased public sentiment), is also, by definition, a stakeholder in the
operations of professional sports. Thus, almost every member of a com-
munity must be considered a part of this stakeholder group. In addition,
the local government, representing the entire community, also has a di-
rect impact on the team through its interactions with the local club.
Thus, this group is a legitimate stakeholder whose needs must be recog-
nized, as without public interest, professional sport could not operate.
However, when teams seek new locations, the bond that exists be-
tween the host community and its heroes on the field, court, or ice, can
be irreparably damaged, and although most die-hard fans continue to
support their favorite team, many become disgruntled with professional
sport. This then spills over to the general public, who sees those in-
volved with professional sport, at a variety of levels, as greedy and self-
serving, which becomes apparent when teams act in obvious self interest.
For example, Raider's owner Al Davis, who has been called "the patron
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saint of stadium extortion,"'67 placed more value on the lucrative agree-
ment between his club and the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Com-
mission in Los Angeles than he did in the public sentiment that the team
would be leaving in Oakland.68 The move itself was an act of opportu-
nism that would ultimately harm the league as a whole.69 Perhaps recog-
nizing the potential harm that the relocation could cause, the NFL tried
to stop the move.70
There are also some obvious financial drawbacks to unwarranted
franchise movement. The relocation of a team to an area wanting a club
harms the league as a whole in a number of ways. First, the league will
forego any expansion fees that would be obtained by an expansion
franchise in the new location.71 In addition, the void left when the ex-
isting franchise moves to a new location can have serious consequences.
The most obvious example again lies in the NFL. After more than a
decade of play in the Los Angeles Coliseum, the Raiders franchise
moved back to Oakland. At the same time, the Los Angeles Rams
franchise moved to St. Louis for the beginning of the 1995 season. This
resulted in a void in the second largest television market in the U.S.,
which did not please the Fox television network, who recently signed a
lucrative television deal with the NFL.72 While these moves have been
for the benefit of the individual clubs, they have caused considerable
harm to the league as a whole. Although the league could easily replace
a vacant host city with a new franchise, what is lost is the affiliation that
67. Crothers, supra note 27, at 80.
68. Support for the Raiders in Oakland was phenomenal. Despite the loss of the team,
one sports bar in the city continued to maintain its silver and black motif and televised every
Raiders game for the thirteen years between the departure of the club in 1982, until its return
in 1995. A. Murphy & M. Silver, Just Move Baby, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 3, 1995, at 27.
69. See D.S. Mason, Revenue Sharing and Agency Problems in Professional Team SporL
The Case of the National Football League, J. OF SPORT MGM-. (Forthcoming, 1997).
70. A detailed account of the events surrounding the move can be found in HARRIS. supra
note 52.
71. This amount, which exceeds $100 million for all leagues except the National Hockey
League, would be divided evenly among league clubs, resulting in an increase in wealth to all
teams equally.
72. The network signed a four year, $1.58 billion deal to televise NFC games. E.M. Swift,
Don, Rupert & Howie: Buccaneering Media Baron Rupert Murdoch Has Enlisted Some Un-
likely Partners in his Efforts to Merge Sports and Show Biz at Fox TV, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Sept. 25, 1995, at 42. However, this deal was negotiated when the NFL was still scheduling
games in the nation's second largest television market. Prior to the departure of both the
Rams and Raiders, the NFL had been the most successful of the four major professional
sports leagues in placing league clubs in the larger markets in the U.S. With NFL teams now
playing in Baltimore and St. Louis, a team or teams in Los Angeles would mean the NFL
would be the only professional league that has clubs in the twenty five largest centers in the
US. See Quirk & Fort, supra note 1, at 296.
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the community had with the original team; in addition, the concerns and
needs of the communities are neglected in the pursuit of increased
revenues.
Some leagues have become increasingly concerned about this prac-
tice; the NFL seems to be the most troubled league regarding franchise
relocation. 73 This is likely due to the fact that revenue sharing practices
have made most NFL teams profitable, and teams that decide to relocate
are not moving in order to survive; rather, they seem to be moving from
a good situation to a great one. In the other three professional sports
leagues, particularly the NIHL, the relocation of teams is usually con-
doned, as it saves teams from financial losses that threaten the future of
the club.74
The threat of relocation has increased the financial wealth of many
professional sports teams, and can be directly attributed to the commu-
nities who have built new revenue-generating facilities. But will this re-
ally help the professional leagues? The answer is yes, but there are other
effects that will, in the long run, hurt the league as a whole. Arguably
the most successful, and most stable, league to operate over the past
three decades has been the National Football League.75 One reason for
the parity among clubs,76 which allows a team from Green Bay to com-
pete for talent on an equal footing with larger urban centers, has been
the creation of revenue sharing practices. Ideally, teams that share rela-
tively equal revenues will not have unfair advantages in seeking out
players and other personnel to produce a competitive team. This is para-
mount in retaining interest in the league product, as the public will even-
73. Even so, the NFL has approved several recent franchise relocations, including the
Houston Oilers' decision to move to Nashville for the 1998 season. However, this move, only
approved after a six-hour meeting, required a $25 million relocation fee and was contingent
upon Congress not enacting "punitive" legislation to penalize such moves, and the completion
of a $292 million stadium. B. Brown, NFL OKs Oilers' Move to Nashville, USA TODAY, May
1, 1996, at 1C. According to NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue, "we don't relish being in a
position such as this, in which we have to choose between communities. If we had our
druthers, we would prefer having a team in Houston and finding a way to respond to interest
in Tennessee." Ben Brown, Owners Searching for Method to Limit Franchise Shuffles, USA
TODAY, May 1, 1996, at 9C.
74. This also is justifiable if the local community does not support the team enough in
terms of attendance and the sale or rental of luxury suites. In Edmonton, the Oilers Hockey
Club was required to meet a certain level of seasons ticket sales in order to obtain some
financial support from the NHL.
75. This fact has been partially attributed to the advent of revenue sharing practices in
this league.
76. The National Football League has been shown to have the greatest competitive bal-
ance. Quirk & Fort, supra note 1, at 248.
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tually lose interest should one team win or lose all the time.7 7 This
practice is undermined by the new facilities being built for NFL teams,
as the revenues generated through luxury boxes7s and seat licenses are
not shared between clubs. Thus, a team such as the Dallas Cowboys,
with its large number of luxury suites in Texas Stadium,7 9 can generate
far greater revenues than teams playing in facilities with fewer boxes.
This puts added pressure on both teams and the local community to
change their existing facilities to compete with other league clubs. The
strain that this puts on communities may or may not be worth the bene-
fits that having a professional sports team may bring to the community.
Thus, a league-wide solution to problems such as small market teams can
be obtained through revenue sharing, rather than placing the burden of
achieving financial and competitive parity on host communities.
As discussed, the NFL has sought to help teams by increasing reve-
nue sharing practices. While the NHL did not react in time to save NHL
hockey in Quebec City and Winnipeg, that league seems to be intent on
helping out its remaining smaller markets. Now, if a city such as
Edmonton can meet minimum standards of season tickets and luxury
suite sales, the NHL is willing to aid the team in order for it to temper
financial losses and to ideally acquire a more competitive club." Simi-
larly, baseball is poised to use revenue sharing as a means to assist
smaller markets.8 ' This behavior would seem to be a step in the right
direction, but what about the fans in Quebec City and Winnipeg? Will
77. If a league became too imbalanced, fan interest would decrease for the weaker
franchises, and would decrease for the dominant franchise as the uncertainty of game out-
comes would be decreased. Id at 243. This would ultimately harm the league; "sustained
incompetence by a number of teams presumably would lead to lowered television revenues - a
loss incurred by all teams because broadcast revenues are distributed equally among league
clubs." L. Kurlantzick, Thoughts on Professional Sports and Antitrust Laws: Los Angeles Me-
morial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 15 CONN. L. Rnv. 190 (1983).
78. Ostfield, supra note 63, at 608.
79. As a comparison, Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry Jones, who also owns Texas Stadium,
is able to generate $40 million a season to operate his club, whereas the owners of the Denver
Broncos are unable to generate any revenues through their lease agreement with Mile High
Stadium. Atre et al., supra note 8, at 57-58.
80. The Oilers are expected to sell a set number of season tickets annually, as well as rent
the luxury boxes that are available at the refurbished Edmonton Coliseum. However, some
criticize the league for continuing to disregard the needs of the small market teams, particu-
larly those in Canada. According to Simpson, Canadian teams are doomed without revenue
sharing in the NHL. Simpson, supra note 51.
81. The plan will see teams like the New York Yankees, Cleveland Indians, Baltimore
Orioles, and Atlanta Braves support teams from Kansas City, Pittsburgh, Montreal, Minne-
sota and San Diego. R. Beaton, Revenue-Sharing Plan Met with Jubilation, USA TODAY, Mar.
22, 1996, at 10C.
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they continue to support NHL hockey? Will they cheer for their own
relocated teams, or will hockey assume a less prominent position in their
lives?
B. The Visible Effects of the Stakeholder
We have shown how the prominence of professional sports leagues in
the lives of many community members has allowed leagues to gain new
facilities, subsidies, and other financial perks. It is difficult to find fault
with the leagues' logic. The teams are only seeking to maximize profit,
and are acting within the restrictions of the law.82 Although fans and
communities have acceded to many of the demands of the sports leagues
and their teams, this leverage cannot continue in the future. The biggest
mistake that the leagues, through their teams, have made is failing to
recognize their most significant stakeholder's interests. A firm should
have two criteria for prioritizing the needs of its stakeholders:
probability and impact. As explained by Starik, these are "those entities
which have the highest probability of interacting with an organization or
those which would have the greatest impact on, or greatest impact from,
the organization's actions. ' 3 Using this criteria, the fans of the teams
and the inhabitants of the communities which host franchises would have
to be considered of utmost priority, yet the actions of the teams and
leagues would suggest that they do not recognize their significance.
Leagues can no longer operate simply to increase their own utility. They
must be operated with the interests of all stakeholders in mind, with the
host community being of top priority.s4
In abusing the sentiment and trust of the fans and communities,
leagues are making a critical mistake. The business aspects of profes-
sional sports have never been more pronounced than they are today.
Lockouts, strikes, unsigned collective bargaining agreements, skyrocket-
ing salaries and ticket prices, union decertifications, and other examples
of the business side of the leagues are covered by the media in as great a
depth as the games themselves. Leagues had always assumed that inter-
est in the game would continue to grow, but the drop in attendance after
the recent baseball strike would suggest otherwise."5 The public, in not
82. According to Fieser, in a capitalistic society businesses operate under two fundamen-
tal conditions: 1) to make a profit; and 2) to obey the law. Fieser, supra note 24, at 458.
83. Starik, supra note 21, at 91.
84. P. Cochran, Essay By Phil Cochran, 33 Bus. & Soc. 98 (1994).
85. During the 1995 season, attendance in Major League baseball dropped 20% from the
strike-shortened 1994 season. For many, the sport had been "given up for dead." Atr et al.,
supra note 8, at 59.
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supporting baseball in as great numbers, is showing the significant power
that it wields in the affairs of professional team sports. It seems as
though the consumer of professional team sports is fed up, and finally
willing to show it. The fan, who creates demand for the league product, is
a primary stakeholder, without which professional sports cannot survive.
Clarkson "recognizes power as a critical dimension of stakeholder man-
agement and suggest that recognizing, and carefully diagnosing and
monitoring power relationships seems fundamental to effective stake-
holder relationships. '8 6 The recent behavior of both the leagues and
their respective player's associations would suggest that this process has
been overlooked, or at least not highly prioritized. Perhaps only when
fans stop attending games, buying league-related merchandise, and en-
couraging their community leaders to obtain franchises, will the power
that this stakeholder group wields become apparent to the team owners.
Should the alienation of fan and community support continue, it may
become irreversible. However, the apparent short-sightedness of the
leagues and teams that hold communities for ransom, only to relccate,
can be partially attributed to the nature of the team-league relationship.
Team owners act opportunistically to seek out new facilities and new
cities in order to increase their own personal wealth. As discussed ear-
lier, this is often to the detriment of the league as a whole. One solution
to this problem would be to have "syndicate sport,"' where one group
owns all the clubs. This would allow for a more even distribution of
resources that would ultimately result in greater parity, and, hopefully,
greater interest in the league product. However, this is not likely to hap-
pen in the four major professional sports leagues for two reasons: 1) it is
unlikely that team owners would relinquish their established autonomy
for the good of the league as a whole, especially when teams are generat-
ing such large revenues and team values continue to climb;88 and 2) fan
support is unlikely to increase if there is the perception of one owner or
group controlling all the teams. The latter reason is easily explained; the
league product is a series of sporting contests, which requires two teams
to produce. The consumer is actually paying to see the players work; the
86. S. Wartick, Essay By Steve Wartick 33 Bus. & Soc. 114 (1994).
87. While uncommon in North American sports today, this format has been used in the
past. An example would be the Pacific Coast Hockey Association, which was owned and
operated by the Patrick family during the 1910s and early 1920s. Today, this approach closely
resembles the operations of Major League Soccer.
88. M.S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-entity Theory: A
Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L. J. 42 (1991).
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product is actually the uncertainty of the game's outcome.s9 Should one
group own or control all the teams, then the fairness and outcomes of
the games could be questioned. This would ultimately undermine inter-
est in the league product. Should this occur, the relationship between
professional sports leagues and their stakeholders would be compro-
mised, suggesting that this is not a feasible solution.
Teams are then separately owned and operated; clubs control all af-
fairs that are concerned with the on-field operations of the team.9° This
is paramount in presenting the image of competition among league
clubs. Thus, although the leagues function as single business entities to
produce and market a single league product, teams must be perceived as
competitors. But because they are legally separate, they can challenge a
league's ability to govern their behavior, as was seen in the Raiders case.
This means that although the leagues themselves may recognize the im-
portance of maintaining and encouraging positive public sentiment, indi-
vidual clubs, such as those that relocate, can undermine interest in the
league product as a whole by relocating or forcing communities to ante
up for new facilities. This only emphasizes how the solution to the ex-
ploitation of stakeholder interests by team owners must be viewed in
terms of ethics; it is unlikely that leagues can completely stop unwar-
ranted franchise movements through league governance mechanisms.
Only when owners acknowledge that they are acting unethically by not
recognizing the interests of the community stakeholder group, and un-
dermining interest in the league product in the long-term, can such be-
havior be fully controlled.
C. Legal Solutions
Until this occurs, one means through which the public has and will
try to stop this behavior is through legal channels. There have been at-
tempts by government entities, at various levels, to try to stop unwanted
franchise relocations; however, since the early 1980s, conditions have be-
come worse, particularly in the NFL.9 Following the Raiders decision,
the NFL, which had seen relative stability in its franchise locations since
89. It is this uncertainty that is crucial to maintaining interest in League games. "Some
degree of uncertainty of outcome is a necessary feature of competitive team sports, and this
uncertainty is largely determined by the relative playing strengths of the teams within a
league. Greater equality of playing strengths and hence more uncertainty about the outcome
of the games, up to some level, is wealth-maximizing." Scully, supra note 1, at 25.
90. See supra note 63.
91. One suggested solution would be to guarantee cities that have lost an existing team
the right to host a future franchise. B. Brown, supra note 73, at 9C.
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the early 1960s, saw many other club owners seek out new locations to
increase their own personal wealth.92 While this may seem to be a nor-
mal business practice for a franchise in another industry, it can be seen
to have had significant detrimental effects to both the league and some
of its stakeholders. When Davis ignored league governance mechanisms
that controlled franchise relocation, a solution to the problem was
sought through legal channels. This dispute, which has been discussed at
length in the legal literature, saw Davis win millions of dollars in dam-
ages from the league.93 Thus, while the law has traditionally been the
means through which societal stakeholders have sought to oversee the
behavior of organizations, 94 professional sports leagues have been able
to avoid excessive control.95
This explains how professional sports leagues can continue to act in
their own self-interest, without concern for the immediate needs of the
general public and, in particular, the host communities. According to
Sethi and Steidlmeier, this coincides with general business practice: "In-
stead of defining corporate interests within the larger framework of the
public good, [businesses have] often resorted to defining the public inter-
est as if it were a secondary and incidental outcome of corporate inter-
ests. '" 96 While stakeholder law may one day make it impossible to
operate solely to create profits for shareholders, 97 it seems unlikely that
legal intervention in the near future will be able to control unwarranted
and unwanted franchise relocations, given the current rash of franchise
movement. Lozano also reports that there has been a general trend for
92. Since the Raiders' move to Los Angeles, the following clubs have moved: Baltimore
Colts to Indianapolis in 1984; St. Louis Cardinals to Phoenix, 1988; Los Angeles (Anaheim)
Rams to St. Louis, 1995; Los Angeles Raiders to Oakland, 1995; and Cleveland to Baltimore
(Ravens), 1996. In addition, the Houston Oilers will move to Nashville for the 1998 season.
93. See, e.g., Kurlantzick, supra note 77, at 193-208. Thoughts on Professional Sports and
Antitrust Laws: Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 10
Er. SPORTS LAWYER 1-4, 27-32 (1983); R. Amoroso, Controlling Professional Sports Team
Relocations: The Oakland Raiders' Antitrust Case and Beyond, 17 RUTGERS L. J. 283-319
(1986); Gray, supra note 33 (1987); J.C. Weistart, League Control of Market Opportunities: A
Perspective on Competition and Cooperation in the Sports Industry, 1984 DuKE LJ. 679-739
(1984); M.A. Wesker, Franchise Flight and the Forgotten Fan: An Analysis of the Application
of Antitrust Laws to the Relocation of Professional Football Franchises, 15 U. BALT. L. REV.
567-590 (1986).
94. M. Huse and D. Eide, Stakeholder Management and the Avoidance of Corporate Con-
trol, 35 Bus. & Soc. 216 (1996).
95. Id. at 212. According to Huse and Eide, "ex post evaluations have shown that large
corporations have been able to avoid undue or excessive control by stakeholders." Id.
96. S.P. Sethi & P. Steidlmeier, The Evolution of Business' Role in Society, 94 Bus. &
Soc. 10 (1995).
97. See Donaldson & Preston, supra note 23.
[Vol. 7:399
1997] APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNISM OR BAD BUSINESS... 423
businesses and industries to self-regulate.9" Due the unique nature of
the operations of professional sports leagues, and the inability of the
leagues to fully control team movement through governance mecha-
nisms, the solution must involve affecting the ethical behavior of the
leagues and their respective team owners.
D. Teams, Ethics, and Recognizing the Public Stakeholder
As discussed earlier, the short term increased financial wealth of the
independent teams will ultimately undermine interest in the league's
product. The leagues and their members must realize that their long-
term relationships with host communities should only be compromised
when absolutely necessary. This means recognizing when markets are
still strong enough to support teams, and also seeing when smaller mar-
kets are unable to continue to host professional teams, rather than al-
lowing communities to cling to the idea of retaining their team and
incurring significant financial losses. One answer to this problem is to
increase revenue sharing practices, but foremost, "corporate and busi-
ness leaders need to be convinced that it is in their long-term interest to
be good citizens and to behave responsibly. Responsible corporate be-
havior-concern for employees, the communities where they are lo-
cated, their customers, and the general public-is good business in the
long run."99 Thus, teams and leagues must identify and uphold commu-
nity interests for two distinct reasons: 1) it is unethical for teams to act
opportunistically without concern for the interests of one of, if not the
most important, stakeholder groups in the professional sports industry;
and 2) should franchise movements continue, thereby undermining in-
terest in the league product, the long term financial well-being of the
league and teams will be jeopardized. While these reasons might seem
intuitively obvious, it remains to be seen whether or not owners and
their teams can adjust to a new rationale for business operations. Can
professional leagues shed the need to operate solely for profit,100 and try
to manage multiple stakeholders to achieve "successful corporate per-
formance?" 101 To expect owners to forego immediate financial gain in
favor of practicing ethical conduct is unlikely. Thus, the owners of the
98. Lozano, supra note 26, at 227.
99. Sethi & Steidimeier, supra note 96, at 10.
100. Professional sports team owners do not always act as pure profit maximizers. See
S.E. Atkinson et al., Revenue Sharing in An Agency Problem: An Example from the National
Football League, RAND. J. OF ECON. 29-43 (1988). Other reasons include civic boosterism,
and ego fulfillment.
101. L. Weber, Essay By Jim Weber, 33 Bus. & Soc. 124 (1994).
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individual teams must be more than subjected to an impassioned plea to
act more ethically. Instead, they must learn to appreciate how the long-
term viability of the leagues as a whole may be damaged. A team can
only function if it has another team to produce the league product with;
thus the health of other franchises (and their host communities) must be
paramount to any league club. This, in the long run, extends beyond
ethical behavior; it is simply good business. In this manner, owners who
do not see their own opportunistic behavior as being unethical can ob-
serve that exhibiting ethical behavior is, in the long term, a sensible busi-
ness strategy. Unfortunately, for some of the major professional sports
leagues, such recognition may only occur after it is too late.
E. The Future?
Stakeholder theory has provided a different way of looking at the
traditional team-league-public relationship. Unfortunately, the unique
structure of professional sports leagues suggests that further problems
will continue in the future. While leagues may recognize the needs of
one of their primary stakeholder groups-the consumers of professional
team sports-the cooperation of all league members is required; "For
farsighted management, increased sensitivity to stakeholder interests will
suggest instituting a code of conduct to guide employees, modifying per-
formance measures, integrating these measures into reward structures,
and reporting ethical performance both inside and outside the organiza-
tion."102 Rather than employees, the professional sports leagues need to
apply these rules to their own teams, to avoid undermining interest in
the league product.
It is also impossible to assess how much public sentiment is harmed
by franchise relocation. This is difficult to determine, as many cities that
lose professional sports franchises, as evidenced by the behavior of those
in Baltimore, become even more desperate for sports teams once they
lose them. But the response of the fans of Major League Baseball, fol-
lowing a work stoppage in 1994, would suggest otherwise; fans and com-
munities are weary of paying higher prices to support rich owners and
their corporations along with the highly-paid athletes they employ. The
1996 All-Star game had the lowest prime-time television rating ever,
10 3
and Fox discovered disappointing ratings for the 1996 World Series, de-
spite the presence of the New York Yankees, television's largest market.
102. L. Brooks, Essay By Len Brooks (1), 33 Bus. & Soc. 118 (1994).
103. Baseball's All-Star Game Plummets to Lowest Rating, USA TODAY, July 11, 1996, at
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Thus, the league, a firm which was concerned with accruing profits
for its teams, must now re-evaluate its operations to continue function-
ing. Baseball has done this in recognizing that it needs its fans back, and
has begun an appropriate advertising campaign to win back lost support-
ers, and entice new ones. The NBA needs to lure back those tired of the
increasingly individualistic and unsportsmanlike players of its league,0 4
and address concerns over a noticeable drop in league scoring. 0 5 The
NFL must stop the rash of franchise relocations that have plagued the
league since Al Davis decided to move south to Los Angeles, undermin-
ing the governance mechanisms that had helped the league to such an
enviable position in professional sports in the 1970s.' 6 The resulting
franchise movements can only reduce fan support for the teams that
many have grown up rooting for and supporting. Finally, the NHL must
work to help its own disadvantaged franchises; although relocating
franchises to new markets will bring in new fans of the sport, this could
be accomplished through expansion, which would result in revenues re-
alized by all league clubs, and avoid the potential loss of public senti-
ment in the abandoned league communities. Ultimately, leagues and
their clubs must recognize the effects that their current behavior has on
the long-term viability of their respective sports. To accomplish this is
no easy task; the ethical dimension of identifying stakeholder needs must
be incorporated into the leagues through institutional, organizational,
and individual learning. 0 7 The likelihood of this fully occurring remains
to be seen; however, there may come a time when the leagues have little
other choice to maintain financially stable operations.
V. CONCLUSION
According to Brooks, "the debate over the existence of stakeholder
rights and claims is... virtually over. For both groups [the fans and the
leagues], the challenge is now to decide on how to balance the claims of
the shareholders [owners] with those of other stakeholders."' 0 Leagues
cannot ignore the damage that the behavior of clubs and league deci-
sions has had on public support of its product. We have looked specifi-
cally at one aspect of this behavior-franchise relocations, and while this
damage has not become critical for any of the four major professional
104. See T. PLUTO, FALLING FROM GRACE: CAN PRO BASEKETBALL BE SAVED? (1995).
105. G. Boeck, Deflation the Trend on the Court: Scoring Drop Worries NBA, USA To-
DAY, Nov. 13, 1996, at 10C.
106. See Mason, supra note 69.
107. See D.J. Wood, Essay by Donna J. Wood, 33 Bus. & Soc. (1991).
108. Brooks, supra note 102, at 118.
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team sports leagues in North America, the power that this group of
stakeholders wields could have a significant effect on the operations of
all four leagues in the future. This could be witnessed through a de-
crease in support for the league products, or refusal to meet the de-
mands of local clubs, an attempt to overcome the power differentials that
teams, leagues and owners have held over the very stakeholder group
that the leagues' survival is dependent upon. However, the importance
of sport in our society suggests that, despite the perceived negative
changes that are occurring in sport that we do not condone, we will prob-
ably continue to support our teams and leagues, and accede to the in-
creasing ticket prices and demands for greater facility concessions.
However, this can cannot continue as it has. Until owners practice cor-
porate responsibility with regards to their stakeholders, the greatest im-
pact that the public, as a stakeholder in this industry, will have on the
business of professional sport will be to implement, enact, or remove any
legal barriers that will alter the operations of the leagues. Or, sadly, we
will simply stop going to games, watching them on television, arguing
over our heroes and their statistics, or letting them assume such a promi-
nent role in our lives; by then, no amount of ethical behavior or stake-
holder management will save professional sports.
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